Opening Hours and Quality Choices by Yamada, Mai
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Opening Hours and Quality Choices
Mai Yamada
18. May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56066/
MPRA Paper No. 56066, posted 19. May 2014 04:30 UTC
Opening Hours and Quality Choices
Mai Yamaday
Graduate School of Economics
Osaka University
May 19, 2014
Abstract
Using a duopoly model with symmetric retailers, we show that retailer strategies regarding
opening hours and quality choices of goods vary depending on the cost structure of the quality
investment in goods. In the case of the cost remaining constant regardless of the length of
opening hours, a retailer with longer opening hours chooses higher quality and charges higher
prices. Conversely, in the case of the cost increasing proportional to opening hours, a retailer
with longer opening hours chooses lower quality and charges lower prices. The latter case is
consistent with the behavior of retailers in Japan.
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1 Introduction
The choice of opening hours is an important issue for retailers such as supermarkets, department
stores, and convenience stores. This is because opening hours may be eective as an instrument
to dierentiate a retailer from competitors. In fact, opening hours vary widely among retailers.
In Germany, Halk and Trager (1999) demonstrate that some retailers stay open for longer hours
and others for shorter hours under conditions of retail competitiveness. In Japan, opening hours
vary with retail categories: department stores such as DAIMARU and high-end supermarkets
such as SEIJO ISHII and KINOKUNIYA open for shorter hours; general merchandise stores
such as AEON, Daiei, and Ito Yokado known as low-end supermarkets open for longer hours.
Since the deregulation of opening hours under Japanese law, these low-end supermarkets have
tended to expand their opening hours.1
In addition to opening hours, retailers determine the quality level of goods: low or high quality.
Retailers may consider that the quality choice of goods, as well as the opening hours, is eective
as a means of achieving a dierentiation from other retailers. Indeed, in Japan, quality levels
vary among retailers. department stores and high-end supermarkets sell high-quality goods, and
general merchandise stores sell low-quality goods.
What factors determine the relationship between opening hours and quality choices of goods?
Dierent types of cost structures of quality investments may have dierent eects on retailers'
strategies regarding opening hours and quality choice of goods. Therefore, we investigate the
relationship between opening hours and the quality choice of goods, considering dierent types
of cost structures of quality investment.
In this paper, we dene two types of cost structures of quality investment: the cost of quality
investment remains constant regardless of the length of opening hours; and the cost of quality
investment increases proportional to opening hours. For example, the cost of quality investment
in processed foods, clothes, stationery, and advertising remains constant regardless of the length
of opening hours. Retailers do not need the additional cost of investment per unit of time to
retain the quality of their goods because the quality of their goods remains the same regardless
of the length of opening hours. By contrast, the cost of quality investment in intangible goods
such as concierge and security services, fresh foods such as sh and vegetables, and daily dishes
increases proportional to opening hours. This is because that retailers need the additional cost
of investment per unit of time to retain the quality of their goods.
We employ a simple model based on that of Inderst and Irmen (2005). We use a framework
that endogenizes the choice of goods quality as well as the variable of opening hours.2 We also
consider two dimensions of horizontal product dierentiation: the rst dimension represents
1Yomiuri Shimbun on March 24, 2004 shows that Japanese low-end supermarkets have expanded their opening
hours since the deregulation of opening hours under Japanese law. For instance, a general merchandise store,
AEON, has 364 branches, 159 of which are open 24 hours, and about 90 percent of which are open later than
11 p.m. In March 2004, 70 percent of the branches of the four major Japanese supermarkets (AEON, Daiei, Ito
Yokado, and Seiyu) were open later than 11 p.m. In December 2004, 70 percent of the branches of Seiyu were
open later than 11 p.m (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 11, 2004).
2As explained below, recent previous papers endogenize opening hours only.
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space and the second represents time. We assume a Hotelling line as the spatial dimension,
and consider two symmetric retailers on the Hotelling line, at both ends of the unit interval.
Consumers are distributed uniformly on the line. To represent the time dimension, we assume
that some consumers can buy anytime, while other consumers face time constraints and cannot
buy beyond closing time. To model the constraints, we assume the length of time line which
represents 24 hours. Consumers who face time constraints are uniformly located on the time
line. Consumers who can buy anytime are located at an end of the time line. Each consumer can
buy one or zero units of the product from a retailer that maximizes his/her utility. Both retailers
incur the cost for quality investments. Also, both retailers charge a single price regardless of the
opening hours. In these situations, the game runs as follows. In the rst stage, retailers decide
the opening hours and the quality of goods. In the second stage, retailers compete in prices.
As a result, we show that the relationship between opening hours and the quality of goods
diers depending on the cost structures of quality investment. If the cost of quality investment
remains constant regardless of the length of opening hours, a retailer with longer opening hours
chooses higher quality. Then, that retailer charges higher prices. By contrast, if the cost of
quality investment increases proportional to opening hours, the retailer with longer opening
hours chooses lower quality. Then, that retailer charges lower prices. The latter is consistent
with behavior of Japanese retailers. Mineo (2005) reveals that consumers recognize that high-end
supermarkets such as SEIJO ISHII set shorter opening hours and charge higher prices than do
low-end supermarkets such as AEON. In addition, many major convenience stores are open 24
hours in Japan. For example, SEVEN ELEVEN, LAWSON, Family Mart and others never close,
which is a major advantage for these types of convenience stores. Previously, major convenience
stores in Japan charged high prices instead of remaining open 24 hours because management
costs increase with longer opening hours. However, major convenience stores witness price
competition. Since 2005, convenience stores have charged lower prices for some goods, and ever
since the largest convenience store (SEVEN ELEVEN) cut the prices of soft drinks in that same
year, other convenience stores have followed (Asahi shimbum, 2005).
Previous literatures highlight the eects of the deregulation of opening hours on retail prices.
Clemenz (1990) shows that the deregulation of opening hours may lead to lower prices by using
the model of consumer search. This is because longer opening hours ease consumers' search
activities. Morrison and Newman (1983) and Tanguay et al. (1995) assume that the access time
to small retailers is low, and the access time to large retailers is high. Then, a large retailer
needs to set a lower price in order to attract demand. With the deregulation of opening hours,
the value of the access time for consumers decreases and the disadvantage of location for large
retailers becomes less pronounced. Hence, large retailers attract demand charging higher prices.
Small retailers set lower prices.
Unlike these previous studies, recent studies consider opening hours as a strategic variable
among retailers. Inderst and Irmen (2005) analyze the eect of the deregulation of opening
hours on retail prices in a model that endogenizes the choice of opening hours. As a result, they
consider that retailers have incentives to use their opening hours as an instrument to relax price
competition by setting asymmetric opening hours among competitors. They show that a retailer
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stays open longer than another if the consumers' preference intensity for time is suciently high.
Similarly, Shy and Stenbacka (2008) analyze how the deregulation of opening hours aects retail
prices. They focus on the eect of consumers' shopping-hour exibility on competition in opening
hours and on prices by comparing consumers who can postpone or advance their shopping time
with consumers who can either postpone or advance their shopping time but not both. They
show that retailers with longer opening hours set higher prices and that asymmetric opening
hours among competitors relax price competition.
Other previous literature focused on competition in opening hours by extending the model
utilized by Inderst and Irmen (2005) and Shy and Stenbacka (2008). These two studies assumed
that consumers are distributed uniformly on the time dimension. By contrast, Shy and Stenbacka
(2006) analyze competition in opening hours by considering consumers who are distributed non-
uniformly on the time dimension. They show that the voluntary provision of opening hours is
ineciently low from a social point of view.3 Wenzel (2011) analyzes competition in opening
hours in the framework of asymmetric rm types: a retail chain store and an independent
retailer. He shows that decisions by retail chain stores regarding opening hours and those of
independent stores depend signicantly on their dierences in eciency.
Our study diers from the above recent studies in the following two important aspects.
First, we consider quality choices of goods as well as opening hours to be strategic variables
for retailers. Although some previous studies focused on only the relationship between opening
hours and prices, our paper discovers an interesting relationship between opening hours and the
quality of goods. Second, we dene two types of cost structures of quality investment: the cost
of quality investment remains constant regardless of the length of opening hours; and the cost
of quality investment increases proportional to opening hours. By dening these, we can show
that the relationship between opening hours and the quality of goods among retailers diers
depending on the cost structures of quality investment.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 shows the results, Section
4 discusses the paper and nally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model presented here is based on that of Inderst and Irmen (2005).4 We consider two
dimensions of horizontal product dierentiation: the rst dimension represents space and the
second represents time.
To represent the rst dimension, we consider a continuum of consumers to be distributed
uniformly on a Hotelling line segment [0; 1] with mass 1. The location of an arbitrary consumer
indexed by x 2 [0; 1] is associated with his/her preferences. There are two symmetric competing
retailers in this market. Let xi (i 2 1; 2) be the location of rm i. The retailers are located at
3Clemenz (1994) shows that a monopolist maintains opening hours that are longer than the social optimal
level. He also shows that opening hours may not represent the social optimal level under perfect equilibrium.
4We simplify the setting concerning disutility of consumers in the time dimension, but allow for a continuous
choice of opening hours. We show that their main insights remain valid in this continuous choice setting.
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either end of the unit interval. Retailer 1 is located at 0 and retailer 2 is located at 1.
To represent the second dimension, we assume the existence of two types of consumers. Type
1 consumers can buy at any time; that is, they can adjust their shopping hours. By contrast,
type 2 consumers face time constraints and cannot buy beyond closing time; that is, they cannot
adjust their shopping hours. To model the time constraints, we use a linear city that is similar to
that in Cancian et al.(1995)5, which uses a duopoly setting Hotelling model with a directional
constraint.6 We assume that the length of the time line is 1. We denote by y the point of
consumers on the time line located at a distance from 0. Let yi(i 2 1; 2) be the location of
retailer i. Each retailer chooses its opening hour yi in view of its impact on price competition.
In this model, yi represents the closing time of retailer i. For instance, if all retailers stay open
until yi = 5=6, then consumers on the line from 5=6 to 1 cannot buy any goods. We suppose
that type 2 consumers are uniformly located on the line and type 1 consumers are located at
y = 0. Also, let K 2 [1=2; 1) be the mass of type 1 consumers and 1   K be that of type 2
consumers.7
Consumers have a conditional indirect utility function Vi(x; y); i = 1; 2. If a consumer buys
from retailer i, his/her utility is equal to
Vi(x; y) =
8<:S + qi   pi   t(x  xi)2 if y  yi,0 if y > yi,
where S and qi denotes the gross surplus all consumers enjoy from a retailer, and qi is quality and
pi is the price charged by retailer i. A consumer living at x 2 [0; 1] incurs a transportation cost
of t(x  xi)2 when the consumer purchases the product from retailer i. The second dimension
(time) does not aect the indirect utility but determines whether or not a consumer can buy the
product from retailer i. Consumers have unit demands, i.e., each consumes one or zero units
of the product. We assume that S is so large that every consumer consumes one unit of the
product. Each consumer buys a product from a retailer that maximizes its indirect utility. Each
retailer is constrained to charge a single price, regardless of the shopping time.8
Each retailer incurs an investment cost for quality. Our paper denes two types of cost
structures of quality investment: the cost of quality investment remains constant regardless of
the length of opening hours; and the cost of quality investment increases proportional to opening
hours. First, the cost structure of quality investment which remains constant regardless of the
length of opening hours is
I(qi) = rqi
2 i = 1; 2; (1)
5To consider a TV schedule problem, they consider a duopoly setting Hotelling model with a directional
constraint. In their model, a consumer can move in only one direction on the Hotelling line. The directional
constraint represents time. For instance, if a consumer locates at 8 p.m., he/she can watch a TV program after
8 p.m. but cannot watch it before 8 p.m.
6Using a Hotelling model, Nilssen (1997) considers an asymmetric directional constraint.
7This is because we assume that there are more consumers who can buy at anytime than consumers who face
time constraints and cannot adjust their shopping hours. Also, we consider this assumption to meet second order
condition, @
2i
@q2i
< 0.
8As mentioned in Inderst and Irmen (2005), high menu costs may justify this assumption.
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where r > 0 represents the parameter of investment costs for quality. This equation (1) repre-
sents that the cost of quality investment does not depend on the length of opening hours. We
take processed foods, clothes, stationery, and advertising as an example of goods with this cost
structure. The quality of their goods remains the same regardless of the length of opening hours.
Thus, the cost of quality investment in their goods is xed regardless of the length of opening
hours. Retailers do not need the additional cost of investment per unit of time to retain the
quality of their goods even if they expand their opening hours. Second, the cost structure of
quality investment increasing proportional to opening hours is
I(qi) = [K + (1 K)yi]rqi2 i = 1; 2: (2)
In the equation (2), K  rqi2 is the xed costs and (1 K)yi  rqi2 is the additional costs that
retailers must pay for maintaining the quality level when opening hours are extended. Also, the
equation (2) represents that the cost of quality investment depends on the length of opening
hours. For example, the cost of quality investment in intangible goods such as concierge and
security services, fresh foods, and daily dishes apply to this cost structure. The quality of their
goods do not remain constant all the day. Thus, retailers need the additional cost of investment
per unit of time to retain the quality of their goods if they expand their opening hours.
The game runs as follows. In the rst stage, retailers simultaneously determine their location
in time yi and choose their quality qi. In the second stage, after observing all the retailers'
locations in time and their choices of quality, each retailer simultaneously determines its price
pi.
3 Equilibrium
To derive the equilibrium outcome in each case of the cost structure of quality investment in
goods, we suppose that the opening hour of retailer 1 is larger than or equal to that of retailer
2; that is, 0  y2  y1  1. In this case, three categories of consumers exist: (i) consumers who
are able to buy from retailers 1 and 2 (category 1, 0  y  y2) ; (ii) consumers who are only
able to buy from retailer 1 (category 2, y2 < y  y1); and (iii) consumers who cannot buy a
good (category 3, y1 < y).
The mass of category 1 is K + (1 K)y2, that of category 2 is (1 K)(y1   y2), and that of
category 3 is (1 K)(1 y1). Given quality and prices, the indierent consumer in category 1 is
x =
(q1   q2)  (p1   p2) + t
2t
: (3)
In both cases of the cost structure of quality investment in goods, the prot functions of each
retailer are
1 = p1[(1 K)(y1   y2) + ((1 K)y2 +K)x]  I(q1); (4)
2 = p2[((1 K)y2 +K)(1  x)]  I(q2): (5)
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where x is given by (3). In both cases of the cost structure of quality investment in goods, the
rst-order conditions lead to
p1 =
q1   q2
3
+
t[(4y1   y2)(1 K) + 3K]
3(1 K)y2 +K ; (6)
p2 =
q2   q1
3
+
t[(1 K)(2y1 + y2) + 3K]
3(1 K)y2 +K : (7)
Substituting p1 and p2 from (6) and (7) into x from (3), we have
x =
q1   q2
6t
  t[(2y1   5y2)(1 K)  3K]
6((1 K)y2 +K) : (8)
On the basis of these results, we analyze retailers' strategies regarding opening hours and choices
of quality in the two cases of the cost of quality investment in goods.
3.1 The cost structure of quality investment remaining constant regardless
of the length of opening hours
In this section, we analyze the case where the cost of quality investment remains constant
regardless of the length of opening hours. Substituting p1 and p2 from (6) and (7) and x from
(8) into (4) and (5), we have
1 =
[K((q1   q2) + 3t) + (1 K)(t(4y1   y2) + y2(q1   q2))]2
18t(K + (1 K)y2)   rq
2
1; (9)
2 =
[K((q2   q1) + 3t) + (1 K)(t(2y1 + y2) + y2(q2   q1))]2
18t(K + (1 K)y2)   rq
2
2: (10)
Dierentiating i (i = 1; 2) with respect to yi, we have the following three patterns of corner
solution: (1) retailer 1 opens for longer hours and retailer 2 opens for shorter hours, y1 = 1,
y2 = 0; (2) both retailers open for shorter hours, y1 = 0, y2 = 0; (3) both retailers open for
longer hours, y1 = 1, y2 = 1.
By examining whether each retailer has the incentive to deviate from opening hours in each
pattern, we can lead to the following lemma (the proof is presented in the Appendix):
lemma 1
If the cost of quality investment in goods remains constant regardless of the length of opening
hours, one retailer locates at y = 1 and the other retailer locates at y = 0 in equilibrium.
A retailer who could earn more prot by deviating would want to change the length of the
opening hours. In the all patterns, we have
@1
@y1
> 0,
@2
@y2
< 0. In pattern (1), both retailers
have no incentive to deviate from locating at y1 = 1, y2 = 0. In pattern (2), retailer 1 has an
incentive to deviate from locating at y = 0. In pattern (3), retailer 2 has an incentive to deviate
from locating at y = 1. Thus, the only equilibrium is pattern (1): retailer 1 opens for longer
hours and retailer 2 opens for shorter hours. This lemma presents the robustness of Inderst
and Irmen (2005). One retailer locating at y = 1 (retailer 1) targets consumers who face time
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constraints and the other retailer locating at y = 0 (retailer 2) targets consumers who can buy
at anytime.
We now discuss how this location strategies aect quality. We derive quality of each retailer
under the equilibrium as9
q1 =
K   3rt(4 K)
6r(K   9rt) ; (11)
q2 =
3rt(2 +K) K
6r(9rt K) : (12)
From the second-order conditions, rt > K9 , we can get the relationship of quality: q

1 > q

2.
Considering this relationship in (6) and (7), the relationship of prices is p1 > p2. Also, the
prots of retailer 1 are larger than those of retailer 2. Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
The quality level of a retailer who locates at y = 1 is higher than that of a retailer who locates
at y = 0. Then, the price of a retailer who locates at y = 1 is higher than that of a retailer who
locates at y = 0. The prots of a retailer who locates at y = 1 are larger than those of a retailer
who locates at y = 0.
A retailer with longer opening hours (retailer 1) chooses higher quality levels and charges higher
prices. The relationship between opening hours and prices is equivalent to Inderst and Irmen
(2005) and Shy and Stenbacka (2008). The intuition of lemma 1 and proposition 1 is the
following. Retailer 1, who commits to opening for longer hours, has a better chance to earn
more prots. Because the cost of quality investment remains constant regardless of the length
of opening hours, investing in quality of goods does not represent a cost pressure for retailer 1,
even with extended opening hours. Thus, retailer 1 promotes investments in quality of goods to
obtain demand. Besides, retailer 1, targeting consumers who face time constraints, can receive
monopoly rents and set higher prices. Conversely, retailer 2, who commits to opening for shorter
hours, has less chance to earn prots. Promoting investments in quality is a cost pressure for
retailer 2. Therefore, retailer 2 does not increase quality investments. Instead, retailer 2 can
meet the high level of demand of the non-constrained consumers by charging lower prices. This
is because the consumers who can buy at any time compare the two retailers. The heterogeneity
of opening hours acquires the function of market segmentation.
3.2 The cost structure of quality investment increasing proportional to open-
ing hours
In this section, we analyze the case where the cost of quality investment in goods increases
proportional to opening hours. Substituting p1 and p2 from (6) and (7) and x from (8) into (4)
and (5), the prot function of each retailer is given by
1 =
[K((q1  q2) + 3t) + (1 K)(t(4y1   y2) + y2(q1   q2))]2
18t(K + (1 K)y2)   [K + (1 K)y1]rq
2
1 (13)
9From the rst-order conditions and reaction functions, a retailer's quality is a strategic substitute.
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2 =
[K((q2   q1) + 3t) + (1 K)(t(2y1 + y2) + y2(q2   q1))]2
18t(K + (1 K)y2)   [K + (1 K)y2]rq
2
2 (14)
Dierentiating i (i = 1; 2) with respect to yi, we have the following three patterns of a corner
solution as the previous subsection: (1) retailer 1 opens for longer hours and retailer 2 opens for
shorter hours, y1 = 1, y2 = 0; (2) both retailers open for shorter hours, y1 = 0, y2 = 0; (3) both
retailers open for longer hours, y1 = 1, y2 = 1.
By examining whether each retailer has the incentive to deviate from opening hours in each
pattern, we can lead to the following lemma (the proof is presented in the Appendix):
lemma 2
Even in cases where the cost of quality investment in goods increases proportional to opening
hours, one retailer locates at y = 1, and the other retailer locates at y = 0 in equilibrium.
In the all patterns, we have
@1
@y1
> 0,
@2
@y2
< 0. As in the case where the cost of quality
investment in goods remains constant regardless of the length of opening hours, only pattern
(1) is equilibrium. In patterns (2) and (3), one of the two retailers has an incentive to deviate
from locating at y = 1 (y = 0) because the retailer can earn more prot by deviating. Lemma
2 also shows the robustness of Inderst and Irmen (2005).
We now discuss how this location strategy aects quality choices among retailers. We derive
quality in the equilibrium as10
q1 =
3rt(4 K)  1
3r(18rt  1 K) (15)
q2 =
3rt(2 +K) K
3rK(18rt  1 K) (16)
From the second-order conditions, rt > 19 , we can get the relationship q

1 < q

2. Considering
this relationship in (6) and (7), the relationship of prices is p1 < p2. The prots of retailer 1
are larger than those of retailer 2 as seen in previous subsection. Then, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2
The quality level of a retailer who locates at y = 1 is lower than that of a retailer who locates
at y = 0. The price of a retailer who locates at y = 1 is lower than that of a retailer who locates
at y = 0. The prots of a retailer who locates at y = 1 are larger than those of a retailer who
locates at y = 0.
Unlike the previous case, a retailer with longer opening hours (retailer 1) will lower the quality
level and charge lower prices. The intuition of lemma 2 and proposition 2 is the following. In
the previous case that the cost of quality investment in goods remains constant regardless of
the length of opening hours, retailer 1 who commits to open for longer promotes investments in
quality of goods to increase demand. However, in the case where the cost of quality investment
10From the rst-order conditions and reaction functions, a retailer's quality level is a strategic substitute.
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in goods increases in proportion to the length opening hours, retailer 1 who open for longer hours
feels a cost pressure if investments in quality are promoted. Thus, retailer 1 lower quality levels
of goods. Instead, retailer 1 obtains demand by setting lower prices. However, retailer 1 has a
better chance to earn prots than retailer 2 because retailer 1 has committed longer opening
hours. As a result, the prots of retailer 1 are greater than those of retailer 2. Conversely, retailer
2, with shorter opening hours, has a reduced chance to earn prots. However, the promotion
of investments in quality is not a cost pressure for retailer 2. Thus, retailer 2, who commits to
shorter opening hours, has an incentive to increase quality levels of goods, leading to charging
higher prices. As in the previous case, the heterogeneity of opening hours acquires the function
of market segmentation.
4 Discussion
On the basis of our results, we demonstrate the implications for management under the dereg-
ulation of opening hours. We assume that there are two symmetric retailers in a market. If a
retailer commits rst to opening for longer hours, that retailer can earn more prots regardless
of the dierences in the cost structures of quality investment. In the case that quality investment
costs increases proportional to opening hours, by intuition, all retailers may have an incentive
to open for shorter hours, but we show that a retailer with longer opening hours can earn more
prots. However, in this case, a retailer with longer opening hours must choose lower quality
in order to obtain more prots. This means that the retailer can benet even without eorts
to increase quality investment. On the other hand, in the case where the quality investment
cost remains constant regardless of opening hours, a retailer with longer opening hours must
choose higher quality. This means that the retailer needs to make an eort to increase quality
investment to obtain more prots.
Our paper assumes that the cost of quality investment in intangible goods such as concierge,
security, and cleaning service, fresh foods, and daily dishes increases proportional to opening
hours. In this case, we show that a retailer with longer opening hours chooses lower quality and
charges lower prices. In Japan, there is a dierence in the quality levels of their goods between
stores with shorter opening hours and supermarkets with longer opening hours. For example,
the quality levels of security and cleaning service at department stores such as DAIMARU and
high-end stores such as SEIJO ISHII with shorter opening hours are considerably higher, so
they charge higher prices. By contrast, general merchandise stores such as AEON, Daiei, and
Ito Yokado with longer opening hours lower the quality levels of security and cleaning service,
so they can set lower prices. Thus, proposition 2 is consistent with all Japanese retailers.
We assume that each retailer is constrained to charge a single price regardless of the opening
hours. However, some retailers implement "time services", in which some goods of a supermarket
become cheaper during certain hours. In other words, some retailers actually change the prices
of fresh foods and daily dishes according to the time of day. In this paper, we assume that menu
costs are high for retailers. However, with the advent of computerized management of price
labels, retailers can change their prices of goods easily and cost eectively. In a future study,
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considering the system of time services, we will reexamine retailers' strategies regarding opening
hours and quality choices of goods.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines competition among retailers with respect to the choices of opening hours
and quality. We employ a duopoly model with symmetric rms. The basic setting is based on
that in Inderst and Irmen (2005). We focus on the relationship of opening hours and choices of
quality between two retailers under the deregulation of opening hours. Our results depend on the
cost structure of quality investment in goods. If retailers invest in goods with the cost structure
of quality investment remaining constant irrespective of the length of opening hours, a retailer
with longer opening hours chooses higher quality goods and then he/she charges higher prices.
On the other hand, if retailers invest in goods with the cost of quality investment increasing
proportional to opening hours, a retailer with longer opening hours chooses lower quality goods
and then he/she charges lower prices. Also, the prot of a retailer with longer opening hours
is larger than that of a retailer with shorter opening hours, regardless of the dierences in the
cost structures of quality investment.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We examine whether retailers have incentive to deviate in each pattern. In the pattern (1),
we have:
q1 =
K   3rt(4 K)
6r(K   9rt) (17)
q2 =
3rt(2 +K) K
6r(9rt K) (18)
Substituting q1 and q2 in (17) and (18) into the rst-order condition with respect to yi and
considering the second-order condition with respect to qi, rt >
K
9 , we have:
@1
@y1
=
4(1 K)t(K   3rt(4 K))
3K(K   9rt) > 0 (19)
@2
@y2
=
(1 K)t(27(K   2)(K + 2)(rt)2   6K(K   4)rt K2)
6K2(K   9rt)2 < 0 (20)
Thus, both retailers have no incentive to deviate because retailer 1 wants to open for longer and
retailer 2 wants to open for shorter. That is, y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 are the equilibrium. Also, in
the pattern (2), we have:
q1 =
K
6r
(21)
q2 =
K
6r
(22)
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Substituting q1 and q2 in (21) and (22) into the rst-order condition with respect to yi, we have:
@1
@y1
=
4
3
(1 K)t > 0 (23)
@2
@y2
=  1
6
(1 K)t < 0 (24)
Thus, retailers 2 have no incentive to deviate because he/she wants to open for shorter. However,
retailer 1 has incentive to do because he/she wants to open for longer. That is, y1 = 0 and y2 = 0
are not the equilibrium. Finally, in the pattern (3), we have:
q1 =
1
6r
(25)
q2 =
1
6r
(26)
Substituting q1 and q2 in (25) and (26) into the rst-order condition with respect to yi, we have
the same result as (23) and (24). Thus, retailers 1 has no incentive to deviate because he/she
wants to opens for longer. However, retailer 2 has incentive to do and he/she wants to open for
shorter. That is, y1 = 1 and y2 = 1 are not the equilibrium. Thus, the only equilibrium is that
retailer 1 locates at y1 = 1 and retailer 2 locates at y2 = 0, and then the quality in equilibrium
are (17) and (18). Also, the quality in equilibrium are greater retailer 1 than retailer 2, q1 > q2.
Proof of Lemma 2
We examine whether retailers have incentive to deviate in each pattern. In the pattern (1),
we have:
q1 =
3rt(4 K)  1
3r(18rt  1 K) (27)
q2 =
3rt(2 +K) K
3r(18rt  1 K) (28)
Substituting q1 and q2 in (27) and (28) into the rst-order condition with respect to yi, we have:
@1
@y1
=
( 1 +K)(K + 6(K2   8K   4)rt+ 9(K3   16K2 + 40K + 80)rt2 + 1296(K   4)rt3)
9Kr(1 +K   18rt)2
(29)
@2
@y2
=
(1 K)( K2 + 12K2rt+ 9( 9K2 + 8K + 4)rt2 + (162K2   648)rt3)
9K2r(1 +K   18rt)2 (30)
Considering the second-order condition with respect to qi, rt >
1
9 , we have:
@1
@y1
> 0 (31)
@2
@y2
< 0 (32)
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Thus, both retailers have no incentive to deviate because retailer 1 wants to open for longer and
retailer 2 wants to open for shorter. That is, y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 are the equilibrium. Also, in
the pattern (2) and (3), we have:
q1 =
1
6r
(33)
q2 =
1
6r
(34)
Substituting q1 and q2 in (33) and (34) into the rst-order condition with respect to yi and
considering the second-order condition, rt > 19 , we have:
@1
@y1
=
1
36
( 1 +K)(1  48rt
r
) > 0 (35)
@2
@y2
=
( 1 +K)(1 + 6rt)
36r
< 0 (36)
Thus, in the pattern (2), retailers 2 have no incentive to deviate because he/she wants to open
for shorter. However, retailer 1 has incentive to do because he/she wants to open for longer.
That is, y1 = 0 and y2 = 0 are not the equilibrium. Finally, in the pattern (3), retailer 1 has
no incentive to do because he/she wants to open for longer. On the other hand, retailer 2 has
incentive to do because he/she wants to open for shorter. That is, y1 = 1 and y2 = 1 are not
the equilibrium. The only equilibrium is that retailer 1 locates at y1 = 1 and retailer 2 locates
at y2 = 0 even in the case where the investment cost for quality increases proportional to the
length of opening hours.
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